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101  
CONFRONTING  THE  ELDER  CARE  CRISIS:  THE  
PRIVATE  LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE  INSURANCE  MARKET  
AND  THE  UTILITY  OF  HYBRID  PRODUCTS  
Peter  Kyle*  
INTRODUCTION  
Frequently   lost   in   the   debate   over   healthcare   reform   are   the  
challenges   posed   by   long-­‐‑term   care   in   the   United   States.    
Although  the  CLASS  Act1  –  the  long-­‐‑term  care  component  of  the  
Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act2  –  represented  nearly  
half   the   savings   attributed   to   healthcare   reform,3   the   CLASS  
program   remained   in   the   background   of   the   healthcare  
discussion  until  the  program’s  actuaries  ultimately  determined  it  
was  unsustainable  and  halted  implementation.4    The  CLASS  Act  
was   one   of  many   recent   failed   attempts   to   expand   coverage   of  
long-­‐‑term  care  in  the  United  States.    In  many  respects  the  CLASS  
program   failed   because   the   program’s   structure   displayed  
disturbingly   little   understanding   of   the   challenges   faced   by  
 
*  B.A.,  English,  Washington  &  Lee  University,  2009;  J.D.,  William  &  Mary  Law  
School,   2013;  M.P.P,   Thomas   Jefferson  Program   in  Public   Policy   at   the  College   of  
William  &  Mary,  2013.  The  author   is  deeply  grateful   to  Professor  Stephen  Carney  
for   his   guidance   and   inspiration.   He   is   also   especially   thankful   for   his   family’s  
unwavering  support  and  encouragement.    
   1.     Community  Living  Assistance  Services  and  Supports  Act   (“CLASS  Act”),  
Pub.  L.  No.  111-­‐‑148,  124  Stat.  148  (2010).  
   2.     The  Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act,  Pub.  L.  111-­‐‑148,  124  Stat.  
119  (2010).  
   3.     Estimated   to   be   $86   billion.   See   Congressional   Budget   Office,   CBO’s  
Analysis   of   the  Major  Health  Care  Legislation  Enacted   in  March  2010:  Testimony  Before  
the  Subcomm.  On  Health,  Committee   on  Energy   and  Commerce,   111th  Cong.   25   (2011)  
(statement  of  Douglas  W.  Elmendorf,  Director,  CBO).  
   4.     Louise  Radnofsky,  Long  Term  Care  Gets   the  Ax,  WALL  ST.   J.,  Oct.   15,   2011,  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204002304576631302927789920.html  
(quoting  Health  and  Human  Services  Secretary  Sebelius  as  stating,  “I  do  not  see  a  
viable  path  forward  for  Class  implementation  at  this  time.”).    
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private   long-­‐‑term   care   insurers.      In   short,   the   CLASS   program  
was  doomed  to  fail,  and  in  its  absence,  the  urgent  need  to  find  a  
solution  to  the  crisis  in  long-­‐‑term  care  provision  remains.  
Some   argue   that   the   right   mixture   of   benefits   or   an  
individual  mandate  could  have  saved  the  CLASS  program,5  but  
regardless  of  the  merits  of  this  argument,  the  political  inertia  in  
support   of   a   comprehensive   public   program   has   long   since  
passed   and  will   not   soon   return.6      An   effective   solution   to   the  
long-­‐‑term  care  crisis  must  therefore  substantially  incorporate  the  
private   sector   and   spur   the   growth   of   private   long-­‐‑term   care  
policies.     Efforts   to   stimulate  growth   in   the  private   sector  have  
thus  far  achieved  only  modest  success,  but  they  also  have  faced  
significant   barriers   and   in   some   respects   have   suffered   from   a  
lack   of   boldness.      One   theoretically   and   practically   appealing  
avenue  of  expanding  private  coverage  of  long-­‐‑term  care  that  has  
not  been  sufficiently  explored  is  the  development  and  regulatory  
promotion   of   hybrid   insurance   policies   that   couple   long-­‐‑term  
care  insurance  with  annuities  and  life  insurance  plans.    In  order  
to  build  an  understanding  of  the  utility  of  this  potential  solution,  
Part  one  begins  by  underscoring  the  demographic  and  structural  
challenges   posed   when   insuring   against   the   risk   of   long-­‐‑term  
care.      Part   two   then   proceeds   by   highlighting   the   instructive  
shortcomings   of   attempts   in   the   past   decade   to   expand   long-­‐‑
term  care   insurance  both   through  private  and  public  provision.    
Finally,   Part   three   explores   the   viability   of   hybrid   policies   to  
create  the  right  blend  of  incentives  that  will  induce  expansion  of  
long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   coverage.      Through   this   analysis,   the  
potential   utility   of   hybrid   products   becomes   exceedingly   clear,  
 
   5.     Rep.  Ted  Deutch,  CLASS  Act  Tackles  Problems  of  Aging,  POLITICO   ,  Nov.  2  
2011,   http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/67429.html   (“even   as   my  
Republican  colleagues  hail  this  as  proof  that  the  Affordable  Care  Act  will  not  work,  
what   they   don’t   realize   is   that   it   shows   that   the   opposite   is   true.      CLASS   was  
included   in   the   Affordable   Care   Act   as   long   as   it   could   be   financially   self-­‐‑
sustaining.      The   administration’s   difficulty   achieving   that   goal   is   proof   that  
individual  insurance  mandates,  first  championed  by  Republicans,  all  work.”).  
   6.     Especially   considering   the   increasingly   dire   straits   of   the   nation’s  
entitlement  programs.  CONG.  BUDGET  OFF.,  THE  LONG-­‐‑TERM  BUDGET  OUTLOOK,  3-­‐‑4      
figs.1-­‐‑1  &  1-­‐‑2  (2009),  available  at  http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10297/06-­‐‑25-­‐‑
ltbo.pdf.  
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along   with   the   need   to   promote   their   growth   through   a   more  
favorable  tax  and  regulatory  environment.  
LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  
DEFINING  LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE  
Conceptually,   long-­‐‑term   care   is   very   different   from  
traditional  healthcare.    Long-­‐‑term  care  does  not  seek  to  diagnose  
or  treat  an  illness,  but  rather  focuses  on  meeting  the  daily  needs  
of   the   disabled.7      Of   the   three   aims   of   healthcare   –   to   cure,   to  
relieve,  and  to  comfort  –  comfort  represents  the  primary  goal  of  
long-­‐‑term  care  services.8    Long-­‐‑term  care  encompasses  a  range  of  
services  that  can  include  medical  care  –  or  skilled  nursing  care  –  
but   consists   chiefly   of   assistance  with   basic   “activities   of   daily  
living”   (ADLs).9      These   activities   typically   include   eating,  
dressing,   bathing,   and   using   the   bathroom,   as   well   as   other  
necessary   tasks   such   as   cooking,   housework,   and   shopping.10    
An   insured  claimant   typically   files   for  benefits  when  he  cannot  
complete  two  of  the  enumerated  tasks  included  in  his  particular  
policy.11    Though  coverage  levels  differ,  the  context  of  long-­‐‑term  
care  delivery  can  range  from  nursing  home  facilities  and  assisted  
living   settings   to   home   or   community-­‐‑based   care,   and   the  
providers  of  such  care  can  vary  from  for-­‐‑profit  agencies  and  self-­‐‑
employed   individuals   to   non-­‐‑profit   agencies   and   family  
members.12      In   recent   years,   community-­‐‑based   care   –   which  
 
   7.     See  Mary  F.  Harahan  &  Robin  I.  Stone,  Who  Will  Care?:  Building  the  Geriatric  
Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Labor  Force,  in  BOOMER  BUST?:  ECONOMIC  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUES  OF  
THE  GRAYING  SOCIETY  233,  233-­‐‑34  (Robert  B.  Hudson  ed.,  2009).  
   8.     See   Alan   M.   Garber,   To   Comfort   Always:   The   Prospects   of   Expanded   Social  
Responsibility  for  Long-­‐‑Term  Care,  in  INDIVIDUAL  AND  SOCIAL  RESPONSIBILITY  143,  143  
(Victor  R.  Fuchs  ed.,  1996).    
   9.     See  Moriah  Adamo,  et  al.,  Paying  for  Long-­‐‑Term  Care,  83  N.Y.  ST.  B.J.  66,  at  71  
n.   45   (2011);      Richard   W.   Johnson   &   Cori   E.   Uccello,   Is   Private   Long-­‐‑Term   Care  
Insurance  the  Answer?,     CENTER  FOR  RETIREMENT  RESEARCH  AT  BOSTON  COLLEGE,  2  
(2005);  Elizabeth  P.  Allen,  A  Fast-­‐‑Growing  Area  of  Concern:  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Insurance  
Litigation,  45  DRI  FOR  DEF.  21,  21  (2003).  
   10.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  1.  
   11.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  3.  
   12.     See  Harahan,  supra  note  7,  at  234  (“Long-­‐‑term  care  services  are  delivered  in  
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includes  respite  care,  home  health  care  from  a  nurse  or  physical  
therapist,   home   meal   preparation   or   delivery,   day   care  
programs,   and   many   other   associated   services   –   has   been  
increasingly   advocated   in   light   of   the   comfort   and   stability   it  
provides.13      Of   course,   however,   provision   of   these   services  
requires  greater  flexibility  in  the  benefits  provided  by  insurance  
policies  and  can   therefore   lead   to  a  concomitant   increase   in   the  
policy’s  price.  
COST  OF  CARE  
Although  long-­‐‑term  care  is  often  unskilled,  the  costs  of  such  
care   have   risen   exponentially,   paralleling   the   traditional  
healthcare  market.      In  2004,   the  average  daily  rate   for  a  private  
room  in  a  nursing  home  was  $192  and  the  cost  for  a  semi-­‐‑private  
room   was   nearly   as   much   at   $169   per   day,   amounting  
respectively   to   $78,100   and   $61,700   each   year.14      These   costs,  
moreover,   are   only   expected   to   rise   in   coming   years.      By   2030,  
the   average   annual   cost   of   a   nursing   home   stay   is   expected   to  
increase  to  $97,000.15     On  the  other  end  of   the  spectrum  of  cost,  
home  health  services  still  represent  a  daunting  burden  to  many  
in   the   aging   population.      In   2004,   the   average   hourly   rate   of   a  
home   health   aide   providing   assistance   with   activities   of   daily  
living  was  $18  per  hour.16    Although  this  rate  may  seem  modest  
upon  first  impression,  because  assistance  is  typically  required  on  
 
residential  facilities  such  as  nursing  homes,  assisted  living  facilities,  board  and  care  
homes,  and  other  residential  care  settings;  by  home-­‐‑  and  community-­‐‑based  service  
organizations,   including   home   health   and   personal   care   agencies,   home   care  
agencies,   and   adult   day   care   centers;   and   by   self-­‐‑employed   individuals   hired  
directly  by  consumers  and  their  families.”).  
   13.     See   Garber,   supra   note   8,   at   146;   See   generally   Andrew   I.   Batavia,   The  
Growing   Prominence   of   Independent   Living   and   Consumer   Direction   as   Principles   in  
Long-­‐‑Term  Care:  A  Content  Analysis  and  Implications  for  Elderly  People  with  Disabilities,  
10   ELDER   L.J.   263,   263   (2002)   (“Recently,   the   concepts   of   ‘independent   living’   and  
‘consumer   direction’   have   become   highly   popularized   among   individuals   with  
disabilities  who   choose   to   control   their   long-­‐‑term  care   and  assistance.     This   trend  
has  enabled  people  with  disabilities  to  live  independently  in  their  communities.”).  
   14.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  2.  
   15.     Karin   C.   Ottens,   Note,   Using   Tax   Incentives   to   Solve   the   Long-­‐‑Term   Care  
Crisis:  Ineffective  and  Inefficient,  22  VA.  TAX  REV.  747,  752  (2003).  
   16.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  2.  
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a  daily  basis  and  often  for  multiple  hours,  these  services  quickly  
become  very  expensive.     Accordingly,  even  if  an  elderly  person  
needing   care   was   only   assisted   for   three   hours   per   day,   he  
would  still  face  an  annual  cost  of  $19,710.17  
COVERAGE  
Given   the   uncertain   but   potentially   devastating   costs   of  
long-­‐‑term  care,  insuring  against  this  acute  risk  is  essential  for  all  
but   the  wealthy   few  who   can   afford   to   self-­‐‑insure.      Currently,  
Americans   can   seek   coverage   through   private   providers   or  
through  Medicaid.18     Although  a  majority  of  Americans  assume  
Medicare  will  cover  the  costs  of  long-­‐‑term  care,19  Medicare  only  
pays  for  “skilled  care”20  and  only  covers  up  to  a  100-­‐‑day  stay  in  
a   nursing   home   facility.21      Accordingly,   Medicare   covers   only  
$42.2   billion,   or   20   percent,   of   the   nation’s   long-­‐‑term   care  
expenditures.22    By  far  the  largest  insurer  –  public  or  private  –  of  
long-­‐‑term  care  expenses  is  Medicaid.    Of  the  $206.6  billion  spent  
on   long-­‐‑term   care   in   2005,  Medicaid   covered   nearly   half   of   all  
expenditures  –  $101.1  billion  or  48.9  percent.23      Indeed,   in  2005,  
 
   17.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  2.    
   18.     See  generally  Jody  Freeman,  The  Private  Role  in  Public  Governance,  75  N.Y.U.  
L.   REV.   543,   599   (2000)   (“Medicaid   is   a   means-­‐‑tested,   federal-­‐‑state   entitlement  
program  that  provides  health  care  to  low-­‐‑income  families  with  dependent  children,  
the   elderly,   and   the   blind   or   disabled.      The   program   provides   federal   financial  
assistance   to   states   that   reimburse  medical   costs   incurred   by   the   poor.     Medicaid  
funding  of  nursing  homes  combines  regulatory  and  contractual  mechanisms.    As  a  
condition  of  receiving  federal  dollars,   the   federal  government   imposes  obligations  
upon  the  states.    Should  they  fail  to  comply  with  federal  law  and  regulations,  they  
can   be   disqualified   from   participation   in   the   program.      States   in   turn   rely   on   a  
combination  of  licensing,  regulation,  and  contract  to  impose  obligations  on  private  
homes  that  provide  care.”).  
   19.     See   Jacob   S.   Hacker,   Restoring   Retirement   Security:   The   Market   Crisis,   the  
“Great   Risk   Shift,”   and   the   Challenge   for   our   Nation,”   19   ELDER   L.J.   1,   45-­‐‑46   (2011);  
Gardiner  Harris   and   Robert   Pear,  Still   No   Relief   in   Sight   for   Long-­‐‑Term  Needs,   NY  
TIMES,  Oct.  24,  2011,  at  D1.    
   20.     See  Adamo,  supra  note  9,  at  67.  
   21.     See  Harris,  supra  note  19.    
   22.     Health  Policy  Inst.,  NATIONAL  SPENDING  FOR  LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE,  Fact  Sheet,    
fig.1   (Feb.   2007),   http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/natspendfeb07.pdf   [hereinafter  
NATIONAL  SPENDING].  
   23.     Id.  
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long-­‐‑term   care   spending   consisting   primarily   of   nursing   home  
reimbursements24   represented  one-­‐‑third  of  Medicaid’s  budget.25    
Unlike  Medicare,  Medicaid   imposes   both   an   income   and   asset  
test,  the  former  of  which  was  recently  increased  to  133  percent  of  
the   poverty   level   under   the   Patient   Protection   and   Affordable  
Care   Act.26      The   asset   test,   however,   represents   the   primary  
barrier   to   seeking   public   provision   of   care   for   many   retired  
elderly   patients.      The   asset   test   varies   by   state   and   by   type   of  
benefit  sought,  but  for  long-­‐‑term  care,  the  maximum  amount  of  
assets  allowed  is  typically  $2,000.27  
Private  expenditures  on  long-­‐‑term  care,  both  through  out-­‐‑of  
pocket  payments  and  through  private   insurance,  account  for  28  
percent   of   the   nation’s   long-­‐‑term   care   expenditures.28    
Developed   in   the   1980s,   private   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   is   a  
relatively  new  mode  of   insurance.29     Despite   the  acute  need   for  
coverage,  private  insurance  has  struggled  to  grow  and  currently  
covers   only   $14.9   billion,   or   7.2   percent   of   long-­‐‑term   care  
expenses.30    When  first  implemented,  long-­‐‑term  care  plans  were  
designed  and  marketed  as  nursing  home  insurance  and  offered  
little   coverage   for   alternative   care.31      Mirroring   Medicaid,  
 
   24.     Medicaid   also   distorts   the   choice   between   institutional   and   home   based  
care,  by  making   it  more  difficult   to   receive   subsidized   care  at  home.  See   Johnson,  
supra  note  9,  at  2;  The  primary  reason  for  this  bias  against  community-­‐‑based  care  is  
the   institutional   inertia   that   has   remained   since   the   program’s   initial  mandate   to  
fund   solely   institutional   care.   See  Daniela   Kraiem,  Consumer   Direction   in  Medicaid  
Long  Term  Care:  Autonomy,  Commodification  of  Family  Labor,  and  Community  Resilience,  
19  AM.  U.  J.  GENDER  SOC.  POL’Y  &  L.  671,  673  (2011);  By  the  early  1980s,  advocates  
demanded  home-­‐‑based   care   and  Medicaid  began   to  provide,   but   the   remnants  of  
the  program  remains  geared  toward  the  provision  institutional  care.  Id  at  673.  
   25.     Note,  Public-­‐‑Private  Partnerships  and  Insurance  Regulation,  121  HARV.  L.  REV.  
1367,  1378  (2008)  [hereinafter  Public  Private  Partnerships].  
   26.     Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act,  Pub.  L.  111-­‐‑148,  124  Stat.  119,  
271   (2010);   Richard  W.   Johnson,  The   Strains   and  Drains   of   Long-­‐‑Term  Care,   10  AM.  
MED.  ASS’N.  J.  ETHICS  397,  397  (2008);  See  also  HENRY  J.  KAISER  FAMILY  FOUNDATION,  
FOCUS  ON  HEALTH  REFORM:  SUMMARY  OF  NEW  HEALTH  REFORM  LAW  1  (2010).  
   27.     Johnson,  supra  note  26,  at    397.  
   28.     See  NATIONAL  SPENDING,  supra  note  22,  Fig.  1.  
   29.     See   Elizabeth   Dietz   &   Jordan   Pfunter,   Long   Term   Care   Insurance   Gains  
Prominence,   BUREAU   OF   LABOR   STATISTICS   (Jan.   28,   2004),  
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/long-­‐‑term-­‐‑care-­‐‑insurance-­‐‑gains-­‐‑prominence.pdf.  
   30.     See  NATIONAL  SPENDING,  supra  note  22,  Fig.  1.  
   31.     See  Frank  N.  Darras  &  Lissa  A.  Martinez,  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Insurance:  It’s  Back  
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however,  private  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  has  evolved  to  cover  
home-­‐‑based   and   other   non-­‐‑institutional   forms   of   care.32      Most  
long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   is   sold   in   the   form   of   a   fixed,   daily  
indemnity   benefit   that   is   paid   when   the   policy   holder   cannot  
perform  a  certain  number  of  activities  of  daily  living.33    Because  
claims   are   often  made  decades   after   issuance   of   the  policy,   the  
pricing  of  premiums  and  the  determination  of  the  policy’s  future  
value  prove  crucial  to  ensuring  both  the  solvency  of  the  insurer  
and   the   ability   of   the   insured   to   make   a   wise   investment.34    
Initially,  many  policies  did  not  offer   inflation  protection,  which  
led   to   the   acute   danger   that   a   policy’s   value   would   be  
eviscerated  over   time.     Today,  however,  many  states,   including  
those   that   have   adopted   the  National  Association   of   Insurance  
Commissioner’s   (NAIC)   model   long-­‐‑term   care   regulations,  
mandate   that   insurance   companies   offer   inflation   protection35  
and  that  carriers  offer  anywhere  from  3  to  5  percent  compound  
inflation  protection.36  
Even  with  the  emergence  of  private  insurance  policies,  out-­‐‑
of-­‐‑pocket   expenditures   still   represent   a  much   larger   portion   of  
private   long-­‐‑term   care   expenditures–a   proportion   that   is  
dramatically  increased  if  one  includes  the  unpaid  labor  of  family  
members.    In  2005,  Americans  spent  $37.4  billion  of  their  private  
assets   on   long-­‐‑term   care,   accounting   for   18.1   percent   of   long-­‐‑
term  care  expenditures.37    If  one  incorporates  the  estimated  $354  
billion   saved   through   the   provision   of   in-­‐‑home,   unpaid   long-­‐‑
 
to   the   Wild   Wild   West   of   Bad   Faith   Litigation,   1   Ann.2006   ATLA-­‐‑CLE   577  
(WestlawNext).  
   32.     Allen,   supra   note   9,   at   22   (“policies   cover   nursing   homes,   assisted   living  
facilities,  home  health  care,  hospice,  respite,  and  alternative  care  services.”).  
   33.     See  3  A.  KIMBERLEY  DAYTON,  ET.  AL,  ADVISING  THE  ELDERLY  CLIENT  §  24:11  
(Thomson  Reuters  ed.,  2013).    
   34.     See  Allen,  supra  note  9,  at  22-­‐‑23.  
   35.     See  Public  Private  Partnerships,  supra  note  25,  at  1383.  
   36.     Increased  Public  Awareness  of  the  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Partnership  Would  Contribute  
to  the  Program’s  Success,  Rep.  No.  09-­‐‑08  (Office  of  Program  Policy  Analysis  &  Gov’t  
Accountability,   Tallahassee,   Fla.)   Feb.,   2009,   at   11   tbl.   A-­‐‑1,  
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0908rpt.pdf.      
   37.     See  NATIONAL  SPENDING,  supra  note  22,  Fig.  1.  
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term  care  services  each  year,38  the  portion  of  the  market  covered  
by   uninsured   private   expenditures   increases   drastically   and  
underscores  the  reality  that  “the  family  remains  the  backbone  of  
our  nation’s  long-­‐‑term  care  system.”39  
RETIREMENT  OF  THE  BABY  BOOM  GENERATION  
In   the   coming   years,   the   nation’s   long-­‐‑term   care   support  
structure  will   become   increasingly   overwhelmed   as  more   than  
76  million  baby  boomers  retire  and  technological  advancements  
continue   to   extend   life   expectancy.40      The   population   over   the  
age  of  eighty-­‐‑five,  whose  demand  for   long-­‐‑term  care  will   likely  
exceed  that  of  any  other  age  group,  is  predicted  to  double  within  
twenty  years  and  quadruple  within  forty  years.41    The  inevitable  
aging   of   the   baby   boom   population,   moreover,   ominously  
coincides   with   the   “weakening   of   the   so-­‐‑called   ‘three-­‐‑legged  
stool’   of   retirement   security   –   Social   Security,  private  pensions,  
and   retirement   savings,”   which   is   already   causing   significant  
unease   among   older   Americans   and   their   families.42    
Compounding   this   challenge,   Americans   have   been   saving   at  
much   lower   rates   than   previous   generations.43      For   example,  
 
   38.     The  AARP  estimates  that  the  economic  value  of  family  caregiving  in  2006  
was   354   billion.  See  AMERICAN  ASSOCIATION  OF  RETIRED  PERSONS   (AARP)  PUBLIC  
POLICY  INSTITUTE,  VALUING  THE  INVALUABLE:    
A   NEW   LOOK   AT   THE   ECONOMIC   VALUE   OF   FAMILY   CAREGIVING,   2   tbl.   1  
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/ib82_caregiving.pdf;  Ottens,   supra   note   15,   at   761-­‐‑
62  (“family  caregivers  currently  reduce  the  total  national  costs  of  long-­‐‑term  care  by  
approximately   $45-­‐‑95   billion   ($4800-­‐‑$10,400   per   caregiver)   by   providing   in-­‐‑home,  
unpaid  long-­‐‑term  care  services.”).  
   39.     Judith  G.  Gonyea,  Multigenerational  Bonds,  Family  Support,  and  Baby  Boomers:  
Current  Challenges  and  Future  Prospects   for  Elder  Care,   in  BOOMER  BUST?:  ECONOMIC  
AND   POLITICAL   ISSUES   OF   THE   GRAYING   SOCIETY   213,   228   (Robert   B.   Hudson   ed.,  
2009);  The  family,  moreover,  is  likely  to  remain  the  backbone  in  the  coming  years,  
as   public   expenditures   become   less   sustainable   and   shift   onto   American   families  
despite   and   perhaps   because   of   the   augmented   demand   for   long-­‐‑term   care.   See  
generally  Jacob  S.  Hacker,  Restoring  Retirement  Security:  The  Market  Crisis,  the  “Great  
Risk  Shift,”  and  the  Challenge  for  our  Nation,”  19  ELDER  L.J.  1,  2-­‐‑3  (2011).  
   40.     See  Allen,  supra  note  9,  at  21.  
   41.     See   Christopher   C.   Jennings  &   Christopher   J.   Dawe,  Long   Term   Care:   The  
Forgotten  Health  Care  Challenge,  17  STAN.  L.  &  POL’Y  REV.  57,  62  (2006).  
   42.     Id.  at  58.  
   43.     See  generally  THOMAS  L.  FRIEDMAN  &  MICHAEL  MANDELBAUM,  THAT  USED  
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forty-­‐‑two  percent   of  Americans   over   the   age   of   forty-­‐‑five   have  
saved   less   than   $25,000   for   retirement.44      Thus,   not   only   are  
Americans   growing   older   demographically   and   facing   steadily  
increasing  costs  of   long-­‐‑term  care,   they  are  also  saving  less  and  
thus   becoming   increasingly   incapable   of   confronting   “the  most  
unpredictable  and  the  greatest  financial,  emotional,  and  physical  
threat”   they   will   face   in   their   old   age.45      In   light   of   these  
demographic   trends,   the   United   States   unquestionably   faces   a  
growing   elder   care   crisis46   that   it   must   confront   in   the   near  
future.  
PROBLEMS  FACING  THE  LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE  INSURANCE  MARKET  
In  responding  to  the  increased  burden  placed  on  families  and  on  
the  Medicaid   system   by   the   demographic   shift   toward   greater  
longevity   and   the   retirement   of   the   baby-­‐‑boom   population,  
states   and   the   federal   government   face   many   structural  
challenges   in   attempting   to   expand   the   private   long-­‐‑term   care  
insurance   market.      Although   the   barriers   to   growth   permeate  
beyond   the   following   categories,   these   four   problems   best  
categorize   the   challenges   policymakers   must   confront:   the  
cavernous   information   gap;   uncertainty   of   the   future;   adverse  
selection   and   its   corollaries;   and   the  presence   of  Medicaid   as   a  
substitute.  
INFORMATION  GAP  
Few   individuals   adequately   evaluate   the   risk   of   needing  
 
TO  BE  US:  HOW  AMERICA  FELL  BEHIND   IN   THE  WORLD   IT   INVENTED  AND  HOW  WE  
CAN  COME  BACK  (2011).  
   44.     Morris  Klein,  The  New  Class  Act,  7  NAT’L  ACAD.  OF  ELDER  L.  ATT’YS    J.  35,  36  
(2011).  
   45.     See  Jennings,  supra  note  41,  at  58.  
   46.     Seth   J.  Chandler,  Long  Term  Care:  The  Next  Healthcare  Frontier,   19  ANNALS  
HEALTH   L.   19,   20   (2010)   (“Finance   of   long   term   care   thus   remains   very   much   a  
frontier,   one   whose   conquest   becomes   ever   more   imperative   as   the   nation’s  
changing   age   distribution   and   the   advances   of   modern   medicine   collaborate   to  
increase  the  number  of  persons  living  for  long  periods  of  time  in  need  of  services  to  
assist  with  ADLs.”);  See  also  Gonyea,  supra  note  39,  at  227.  
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long-­‐‑term  care,  both  because  the  risk  is  in  the  distant  future  and  
because   few   readily   envision   spending   their   final   years  
completely   dependent   on   others.      To   put   the   problem   in  
perspective,  the  likelihood  that  a  fire  will  damage  one’s  home  is  
1   in  1200  and   the   likelihood   that  an  accident  will  destroy  one’s  
car  is  1  in  240,  but  the  chance  that  a  person  will  spend  2.5  years  
in  a  nursing  home  is  1  in  3.47    The  undeniable  message  is  that  the  
vast  majority  of  individuals,  especially  younger  adults,  routinely  
ignore   or   fail   to   recognize   this   serious   risk.      The   chronic  
underestimation  of   the  need  for   long  term  care  has  accordingly  
been   dubbed   “the   5%   fallacy”48   in   reference   to   the  
disproportionately  low  rates  of  private  long  term  care  insurance  
coverage.49      At   its   most   fundamental   level,   the   failure   to  
appreciate   the   severity  of   the   risk   that  one  will  need   long-­‐‑term  
care   services   is   properly   conceived   of   as   part   information   gap,  
part   irrational   action.      In   other  words,   not   only   do   individuals  
not   understand   the   likelihood   that   they   will   face   the   costs   of  
long-­‐‑term  care,   but   even  when   confronted  with   this   likelihood,  
many   dismiss   this   risk   as   for   whatever   reason   inapplicable   to  
them.      The   unfortunate   reality,   of   course,   is   that   many   of   the  
ailments   that   lead   older   Americans   to   become   dependent   (i.e.  
Alzheimer’s   disease   and  dementia)   have   little   to  do  with   one’s  
physical   health   and   even   less   to   do   with   one’s   perception  
thereof.    Compounding  this  problem  is  the  hesitation  of  many  to  
maintain   expensive   premiums   to   guard   against   a   very   distant  
risk   that  may   never  materialize,   leaving   the   policyholder   with  
nothing   to   show   for   his   effort.50      With   seemingly   infinite  
expenses   and  manifestly   finite   resources,   would-­‐‑be   purchasers  
 
   47.     See  Darras,  supra  note  31.  
   48.     Andrea  L.  Campbell  &  Kimberly  J.  Morgan,  Federalism  and  the  Politics  of  Old  
Age  Care  in  Germany  and  the  United  States,  38  COM.  POL.  STUD.  887,  892  (2005).  
   49.     See  Hacker,  supra  note  19,  at  22-­‐‑23.  
   50.     See  Marc   P.   Freiman,  A   Look   at   Hybrid   Insurance   Products   with   Long-­‐‑Term  
Care   Insurance,  AARP   24   (2007)   (“Rather   than   viewing   their   premiums   as   having  
paid   for   insurance   against   a   catastrophic   risk   that   (fortunately)  never   came,   some  
consumers  may  feel  that  they  have  ‘lost’  or  ‘wasted’  all  of  their  premium  payments,  
even  though  they  probably  do  not  adopt  similar  perspectives  towards  home  and  car  
insurance.”),  http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/2007_11_hybrid.pdf.  
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find   it  difficult   to  prioritize  guarding  against  a   future   risk  over  
more   imminent   expenses.      Of   course,   by   the   time   the   risk   of  
long-­‐‑term   care   looms,   premiums   are   insurmountably   high   for  
the  average  American.51  
UNCERTAINTY  OF  RISK  
The  role  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  plays  in  guarding  against  
a  uniquely  distant  risk  not  only  affects  the  potential  purchaser’s  
behavior,   but   also   poses   significant   challenges   to   insurers.     An  
actuary  attempting  to  price  an  insurance  policy  for  a  forty-­‐‑year-­‐‑
old   individual   must   predict   that   individual’s   likelihood   of  
needing   long-­‐‑term   care   services   several   decades   in   advance.52    
When   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   policies   were   first   introduced,  
underwriting  decisions  were  predicated  upon   the   same   criteria  
that   applied   to   health   insurance   coverage,   but   insurers   swiftly  
recognized   that   this   approach   did   not   adequately   capture   the  
likelihood   that   an   applicant   would   need   long-­‐‑term   care.53    
Currently,   underwriting   for   LTC   insurance   evaluates   an  
individual’s   predisposition   to   cognitive   impairment   and  
functional  disability,  and  is  less  concerned  with  the  diagnosis  of  
diseases.54      Yet   in   making   underwriting   evaluations,   “the  
informational   asymmetries   and   inefficiencies   that   have  
characterized   health   care   insurance   are   magnified,”55   due   in  
large  part  to  the  distant  predictions  required.56     Even  if  insurers  
 
   51.     Long-­‐‑Term   Care:      Baby   Boom   Generation   Increases   Challenge   of   Financing  
Needed  Services:  Testimony  Before  the  Finance  Comm.,  107th  Cong.  13  (2001)  (statement  
of  William  J.  Scanlon,  Dir.  Health  Care  Issues)  (reporting  that  one  GAO  study  found  
that   only   ten   to   twenty   percent   of   older   Americans   can   afford   long   term   care  
insurance  coverage).  
   52.     JOSHUA   M.   WIENER,   LAUREL   HIXON   ILLSTON,   &   RAYMOND   J.   HANLEY,  
SHARING   THE   BURDEN:   STRATEGIES   FOR   PUBLIC   AND   PRIVATE   LONG-­‐‑TERM   CARE  
INSURANCE  15  (1994).  
   53.     See  Allen,  supra  note  9,  at  22.  
   54.     Id.    
   55.     See  Garber,  supra  note  8,  at  154-­‐‑55.  
   56.     Wiener,  supra  note  52,  at  15  (“Small  changes  in  assumptions  compounded  
over   long   periods   of   time   can   drastically   change   a   product’s   profitability.”);  
Chandler,   supra   note   46,   at   22   (“Little  has  been  done  at   either   the   federal   or   state  
levels  to  address  the  difficulty  private  insurers  have  of  actually  writing  LTCI  where  
the  scope  and  magnitude  of  future  risks  are  so  difficult  to  discern.”).      
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could  reliably  assess  future  likelihood  that  a  policyholder  would  
develop  a  condition  requiring  long-­‐‑term  care,  the  uncertainty  of  
the   effects   that   technological   advancement   will   have   on   such  
care   inexorably   complicates   the   equation.      For   example,  
researchers   could   find   a   cure   for   Alzheimer’s,   or   they   could  
simply  enable  patients  with  this  disease  to  live  even  longer  –  the  
former  would   reduce   costs  while   the   latter  would  dramatically  
increase   them.     Finally,   these  uncertainties  are  compounded  by  
the  “actuarial   infancy”57  of   long-­‐‑term  care   insurance.     Unlike   in  
the   life   insurance  context,   actuaries  attempting   to  price  policies  
do   not   have   the   benefit   of   scores   of   data   and   experience   to  
support  their  findings.58    The  result  is  a  more  expensive  product  
with   thinner   coverage   that   is   “riddled  with   exceptions.”59      The  
unattractiveness  of  these  policies,  in  turn,  contributes  to  the  next  
and   perhaps   most   acutely   prohibitive   challenge   faced   by   the  
LTC  insurance  market:  adverse  selection.  
ADVERSE  SELECTION  
The   low   take-­‐‑up   rate   for   younger   individuals,   combined  
with   the   uncertainty   embedded   in   any   attempt   to   price   long-­‐‑
term   care   policies,   inflates   premium   prices   that  would   already  
be   high   in   light   of   the   rising   costs   of   long-­‐‑term   care.60      These  
rising  premiums   trigger   the  adverse   selection  problem   that  has  
plagued   the   long-­‐‑term   care   market   since   its   inception.      As  
premiums  increase,   low-­‐‑risk  users  are  priced  out  of  the  market.    
As   these   low-­‐‑risk   users   exit,   the   risk   pool   remaining   becomes  
increasingly   dominated   by   relatively   high-­‐‑risk   users.      Even  
though   this   effect   is   limited   by   the   rejection   of   as   many   as   15  
 
   57.     Chandler,  supra  note  46,  at  23  (noting  that   long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  is  not  
like   life   insurance  where   risks   are   now  modeled  well   enough   that   regulators   are  
more  capable  of  determining  adequate  premiums,  and  cautioning  that  “the  inability  
of   regulators   to   accurately   assess   LTCI   pricing   has   serious   consequences   for   the  
ability   of   a   for-­‐‑profit   market   to   flourish,”   as   regulators   can   blindly   be   over-­‐‑
restrictive  or  under-­‐‑restrictive).    
   58.     See  Garber,  supra  note  8,  at  156.  
   59.     See  Hacker,  supra  note  19,  at  23.    
   60.     See  infra  p.  112-­‐‑113.    
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percent  of  all  potential  purchasers61  –  a  likelihood  that  increases  
as   one   ages62   –   the   relatively   risky   pool   can   nevertheless   force  
insurers   to   increase   premiums   further.63      Although   adverse  
selection   has   not   yet   become   severe   enough   to   cause   a   “death  
spiral”  in  the  national  market  for  long-­‐‑term  care,  it  has  inhibited  
the  private  market’s  ability  to  grow  beyond  its  7.2  percent  share  
of  overall   long-­‐‑term  care  coverage.     Moreover,  a  “death  spiral”  
has  arguably  taken  hold  in  individual  insurer’s  risk  pools,  as  the  
past   few   years   have   seen   the   notable   exit   of   a   number   of  
insurers,   including   Met   Life.64      Without   significant   changes   in  
the   structure   of   the  market   and  policies   supporting   its   growth,  
those  insurers  that  have  remained  will  continue  to  struggle  and  
may  ultimately  face  the  same  fate.  
MEDICAID  AS  A  SUBSTITUTE  
Perhaps   the   most   basic   and   recognizable   inhibitor   of   the  
long-­‐‑term  care   insurance  market   is   the  presence  of  Medicaid  as  
an  ostensibly   free   substitute   for   long-­‐‑term  care   insurance.65     As  
one  economist  studying  the  long-­‐‑term  care  market  noted,  “[y]ou  
can’t   sell   apples.  .  .on   this   side   of   the   street   if   someone.  .  .is  
 
   61.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  5.  
   62.     Twenty-­‐‑five  percent  of  those  between  the  ages  of  60  and  69  and  forty-­‐‑five  
percent   of   those   between   the   ages   of   70   and   79   are   denied   coverage.   See   Eileen  
Ambrose,  As  America  Ages,  Issue  of  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Emerges,  BALTIMORE  SUN,  Nov.  6,  
2011.  
   63.     Insurers,   in   fact,   must   increase   premiums   in   view   of   the   solvency  
requirements  imposed  by  regulators.    TOM  BAKER,  INSURANCE  LAW  AND  POLICY  25  
(2d  ed.  2008)(“To  promote   insurer   solvency,   state   statutes   limit   the  organizational  
structures  in  which  the  insurance  business  can  be  conducted;  regulate  relationships  
among   insurers   and   their   affiliates   or   holding   companies;   impose   minimum  
capitalization,   surplus,   and   reserve   requirements;   require   disclosure   of   various  
kinds  of  financial  information;  regulate  rates;  control  the  kinds  and  proportions  of  
investments   insurers   can   make;   and   create   guaranty   associations   to   cover   the  
financial  obligations  of  insolvent  insurers  through  assessments  on  all  insurers.”).  
   64.     The  “death  spiral,”  however,  has  caused  the  exit  of  a  number  of  individual  
companies  from  the  market,  including  Met  Life.    See  Brett  Norman,  CLASS  Dismissal  
Leaves   White   House   Without   a   Plan   B,   POLITICO,   October   24,   2011,  
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66730.html.  
   65.     See   Ottens,   supra   note   15,   at   765   (quoting   the   President   of   the  Center   for  
Long-­‐‑Term  Care  financing  as  stating  that  “[t]he  reason  more  people  don’t  buy  long-­‐‑
term-­‐‑care  insurance  is  that  the  government  has  been  paying  for  [long-­‐‑term  care]  for  
35  years,  and  the  public  has  become  anesthetized  to  the  risk.”).      
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giving   them   away   on   the   other   side   of   the   street.”66     Although  
Medicaid  of  course  is  by  no  means  free,  as  the  taxpayer  incurs  a  
substantial   expense,67   those   faced   with   the   daunting   cost   of  
private  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  premiums  nevertheless  view  it  
as  such.    To  a  great  extent,  the  perceived  preference  for  Medicaid  
is   not   illogical.      Many   insurance   consumer   advocacy   groups  
discourage   low   to   moderate   income   individuals   from  
purchasing   private   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance,   claiming   that  
private  coverage  is  unwise  for  those  who  would  quickly  qualify  
for   Medicaid   if   they   became   disabled   and   required   long-­‐‑term  
care  services.68  
The   key   distinguishing   feature   of   Medicaid   is   that   it  
requires   impoverishment   by   imposing   an   asset   test.      The   asset  
test   varies   by   state   and   type   of   benefits   sought   through  
Medicaid,  but  typically  hovers  around  $2,000.69    For  many  in  the  
middle  class,  however,  no  viable  alternative  exists  and  Medicaid  
thus  perversely  causes  elders  to  deplete  the  vast  majority  of  their  
private  savings   in  order   to  become  eligible.70     This  spend-­‐‑down  
phenomenon  leaves  elders  with  nothing  to  pass  on  to  their  heirs  
and   becomes   particularly   problematic   when   those   who   have  
only   temporary   long-­‐‑term   care   needs   return   to   the   community  
with  no   income  or  savings.     Moreover,  while  Medicaid  reforms  
have  increased  the  amount  of  assets  reserved  for  spouses,  these  
reserves   have   proven   woefully   insufficient   to   ensure   the  
financial  stability  of  husbands  and  wives  who  may  live  decades  
 
   66.     Joshua  M.  Wiener,   Jane   Tilly,   and   Susan  M.  Goldenson,  Federal   and   State  
Initiatives  to   Jump  Start   the  Market   for  Private  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Insurance,  8  ELDER  L.J.  
57,  98  (2000).  
   67.     In  2002,  long-­‐‑term  care  accounted  for  19  percent  of  all  Medicaid  spending,  
and,  in  2005,  Medicaid  represented  the  single  largest  budget  item  in  state  budgets.  
See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  5.    
   68.     See,   e.g.,      Ottens,   supra   note   15,   at   766   (quoting   one   consumer   insurance  
advocate   as   stating   that   “long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   is   not   appropriate   for   certain  
people   and   should   not   be   sold   to   them,   particularly   those   who   would   quickly  
qualify  for  Medicaid  if  they  were  to  require  long-­‐‑term  care  services.”).      
   69.     See   Johnson,   supra  note   27   and   accompanying   text   (noting   that  Medicaid  
recipients  must   “surrender  all   of   their   assets,   except   for   about  $2,000”   in  order   to  
qualify  for  coverage).    
   70.     See  Jennings,  supra  note  41,  at  62;  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  5.  
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longer   than   their   spouses.71     While   some  argue   that  Medicaid’s  
de   facto   coverage   of   the   middle   class   represents   the   legislative  
intent   of   the   program,72   others   argue   that   the   middle   class   is  
abusing  the  Medicaid  system  and  policymakers  should  “restrict  
eligibility   to   the   truly   poor.”73      Part   of   this   latter   argument   is  
grounded  in  the  legitimate  concern  about  the  dishonest  practice  
of   divesting   or   hiding   assets   in   order   to   become   eligible   for  
Medicaid.74    The  only  viable  solution  to  this  facet  of  the  problem  
is   closer   monitoring   of   asset   transfers   prior   to   application   for  
benefits,   a   costly   strategy   of   limited  marginal   utility.      Further,  
the   alternative   suggestion   that   policymakers   restrict   benefits   to  
the   “truly   poor”   quickly   proves   myopic,   even   after   a   cursory  
examination.      Such   an   attempt   would   draw   a   troubling   line  
between   individuals   who   did   not   save   their   resources   who  
would   remain   eligible   for   Medicaid   and   middle-­‐‑class  
individuals   who   exhausted   their   savings   on   private   long-­‐‑term  
care  provision  who  would  not.    The  suggestion  that  middle  class  
individuals   are   somehow   less   entitled   is   not   only   illogical,   but  
also   politically   untenable.      Indeed,   the   broader   political  
intractability   of   addressing   the   availability   of   Medicaid   as   a  
substitute   led   one   leading   actuary   studying   the   long-­‐‑term   care  
market   to   describe   Medicaid   as   “the   elephant   in   the   room.”75    
Accordingly,   in  the  absence  of  a  desirable  alternative,  Medicaid  
will   in   all   likelihood   remain   the   lesser   of   two   evils   for  middle  
class   individuals   evaluating   their   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance  
options.  
 
   71.     See  Johnson,  supra  note  9,  at  5.  
   72.     See   Joshua  M.  Wiener,   Long-­‐‑Term   Care   and   Devolution,   in  MEDICAID   AND  
DEVOLUTION:   A   VIEW   FROM   THE   STATES   185,   185   (Frank   J.   Thompson   &   John   J.  
DiIulio  Jr.  eds.,  1998).      (“Many  policymakers  and  analysts  disparage  the  large  role  
that  long-­‐‑term  care  plays  in  the  Medicaid  budget,  claiming  that  it  was  unintended.  
That   role,   however,   is   consistent   with   the   program’s   historical   antecedents   and  
legislative  intent.”).    
   73.     See   Jeffrey   L.   Soltermann,   Medicaid   and   the   Middle   Class:   Should   the  
Government  Pay  for  Everyone’s  Long-­‐‑Term  Health  Care?,  1  ELDER  L.J.  251,  289-­‐‑90  (1993).    
   74.     See  id.  at  289.    
   75.     Allen   Schmitz,   Living   Up   to   Its   Name:   How   to   Fix   the   Class   Act,   URBAN  
INSTITUTE   SYMPOSIUM   at   47:33   (March,   24,   2011,   9:00   AM),  
http://www.urban.org/events/How-­‐‑to-­‐‑Fix-­‐‑the-­‐‑Class-­‐‑Act.cfm.  
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EFFORTS  TO  EXPAND  THE  LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE  MARKET  
The   difficult   challenges   posed   by   the   aging   population,  
increasing   costs,   and   gap   in   coverage   among   the   middle   class  
have  not  gone  unnoticed  by  lawmakers.    Long-­‐‑term  care  served  
as  a  key   issue   in  both  George  W.  Bush’s  presidential   campaign  
in  2004  as  well  as  Bill  Clinton’s  presidential  campaign  in  1996.76    
Further,   policymakers   at   both   the   state   and   federal   level   have,  
over  the  years,  addressed  the  long-­‐‑term  care  challenge  through  a  
diverse  set  of   initiatives  aimed  at  encouraging  the  expansion  of  
private   sector   provision   of   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance.      The  
primary   modes   of   incentivizing   individuals   to   purchase   long-­‐‑
term   care   insurance   have   been   tax   incentives,   public-­‐‑private  
partnerships,   and   the   creation   of   insurance   plans   for  
government   employees.      Each   of   these   measures   aims   both   to  
decrease  the  burden  placed  on  Medicaid  and  to  facilitate  the  risk  
sharing  capacity  of  private  insurance.  
TAX  INCENTIVES  
Tax   incentives   relating   to   the   purchase   of   long-­‐‑term   care  
insurance   exist   both   for   individuals   and   employers   at   both  
federal  and  state  levels.    Under  the  Health  Insurance  Portability  
and   Accountability   Act   of   1996   (HIPAA),   out-­‐‑of-­‐‑pocket  
payments  for  qualified  private  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  policies  
are  deductible  as  medical  expenses  if  they  exceed  7.5  percent  of  
an   individual’s   adjusted   gross   income   (AGI).77      However,   the  
amount   of   qualified   premiums   that   may   count   toward   a  
deduction   is   capped   based   on   age.78      After   the   federal  
implementation   of   tax   incentives   for   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance  
 
   76.     See  Robert  Pear,  Bush  and  Kerry  Push  Domestic  Plans,  Leaving  Off  Price  Tags,  
N.Y.   TIMES,   Oct.13,   2004,   http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/13/politics/campaign/  
13spend.html#;  See  Bill  Clinton   1996  On  The   Issues   Fighting   for  Quality  Health  Care,  
4PRESIDENT.US,   (Dec.   2,   2013)   http://www.4president.us/issues/clinton1996/  
clinton1996healthcare.htm.    
   77.     Health   Insurance  Portability  and  Accountability  Act,  Pub.  L.  No.  104-­‐‑191,  
110  Stat.  1936,  2041-­‐‑42  (1996);  See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  63.    
   78.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  63.  
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policies,  states  followed  suit  with  their  own  tax  deductions  and  
credits   for   long-­‐‑term   care   premium   payments.79      For   example,  
since  2006,  individuals  in  Virginia  have  been  able  to  receive  a  tax  
credit  equal   to   fifteen  percent  of   the   total   long-­‐‑term  care  policy  
premiums  paid  in  a  given  year.80  
In   addition   to   individual   tax   incentives,   legislatures   have  
also   turned   to   employer   tax   incentives   in   an   attempt   to  
encourage   younger   adults   to   take   part   in   the   long-­‐‑term   care  
insurance   scheme.     Not   only  do  younger  purchasers   face  more  
affordable   premiums,81   their   inclusion   enhances   the  
sustainability   of   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   primarily   by  
counterbalancing   the   adverse   selection   tendencies   of   long-­‐‑term  
care   insurance  pools.82      In  addition  to  encouraging  purchase  by  
younger  adults,  group  policies  reduce  costs  and  improve  quality  
because  of  the  better  negotiating  position  of  benefit  managers  for  
employer  sponsored  groups.83    As  with  individual  policies,  both  
federal  and  state  tax  incentives  exist  for  employer  contributions  
to   long-­‐‑term   care.      Under   HIPAA,   for   example,   employer  
contributions  are  deductible  as  business  expense.84     Some  states  
allow   a   deduction   to   the   extent   provided   by   the   federal  
government,   while   others   have   developed   more   nuanced  
approaches.85      On   the   whole,   state   tax   incentives   have   proven  
more   modest   than   federal   tax   incentives   and,   when   coupled  
with   lower   state   tax   rates,   have   had   a   minimal   impact   on  
purchase.86  
Although  the  impetus  behind  the  use  of  tax  incentives  term  
care   insurance   was   sound,   the   efficacy   of   these   measures   has  
proven   less   certain.      Tax   incentives   are   notably   ineffective   for  
 
   79.     Id.  at  67-­‐‑68.  
   80.     Facts  About  Long-­‐‑Term  Insurance  in  Virginia  (Va.  St.  Corp.  Comm’n,  Bureau  
of  Ins.,  Richmond,  Va.)  Aug.,  2007,    
http://www.ltcconsultants.com/pdfdocs/  taxincentivesbystate020508.pdf.  
   81.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  71.  
   82.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  52,  at  63.  
   83.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  71.  
   84.     Id.  at  72.  
   85.     See  AMERICAN  COUNCIL  OF  LIFE  INSURERS,  supra  note  80.  
   86.   See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  72-­‐‑73.      
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individuals   without   a   tax   liability,   and   few   taxpayers   itemize  
their  deductions  while  still  fewer  claim  a  deduction  for  medical  
expenses.87    As  a  result,  the  use  of  tax  incentives  to  stimulate  the  
market   has   been   criticized   as   an   “ineffective   and   inefficient  
solution[]  to  curb  the  costs  of   long-­‐‑term  care”88  and,  at  the  very  
least,  insufficient  to  engender  substantial  increases  in  coverage.89    
In   her  Note   on  Using  Tax   Incentives   to   Solve   the   Long-­‐‑Term  Care  
Crisis,   Karin   Ottens   argues   that   tax   incentives   are   inadvisable,  
because  instead  of  encouraging  taxpayers  to  plan  for  and  finance  
the   future   costs   of   long-­‐‑term   care,   they   merely   provide  
deductions   to   those   who   likely   “would   have   purchased   the  
insurance  policy   even  without   the  deduction.”90     Ottens   argues  
that,  as  a  result,   these  deductions  and  credits  “merely  create  an  
extremely   large   tax   revenue   loss.”91     Although  Ottens  offers  no  
empirical   support   of  her   assertion,  her   conclusion   is   somewhat  
supported  by  the  correlating  stagnation  of  the  private  market  for  
long-­‐‑term   care   insurance.      Ottens’   argument,   however,   is  
perhaps  properly   reformulated   as   supportive   of   the   contention  
that  current  tax  incentives  are  insufficiently  strong,92  rather  than  
inherently   unsuitable.      While   the   success   of   tax   provisions   in  
stimulating   the   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   market   has   proven  
“quite   modest,”93   such   modesty   also   characterizes   the   tax  
provisions  themselves.    Few  would  conclude  that  tax  incentives  
 
   87.     “In   1997…only   four   percent   claimed   a   deduction   for  medical   expenses.”  
Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  65.      
   88.     See  Ottens,  supra  note  15,  at  750.  
   89.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  64.  
   90.     See  Ottens,  supra  note  15,  at  762.  
   91.     See  id.  
   92.     See   Chandler,   supra   note   46,   at   21-­‐‑22   (noting   that   in   section   7702B,   for  
example,   the   Internal   Revenue  Code   endeavors   to   encourage   purchase   long-­‐‑term  
care   insurance   policies,   but   by   imposing   a   prohibition   on   cash   surrender   values  
“forces   an   uninsurable   risk   of   lapse   onto   policyholders”   and   “effectively   induces  
insurers   to  protect  against  unforeseen  cost   increases  not  by  charging  a  predictable  
high   premium...but   by   reserving   a   frightening   and   not   infrequently   exercised  
unlimited  right  to  raise  premiums  should  costs  increase.”).      
   93.     See  Chandler,   supra   note   46,   at   20   (“The   federal   government,   sometimes  
working  in  collaboration  with  the  states,  has  created  some  tax  and  other  incentives  
to  enhance  the  private  LTCI  market.    The  ambition  and  success  of  these  provisions  
in  stimulating  the  market  must  be  regarded  as  quite  modest  and,  in  some  instances  
counterproductive.”).  
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do   not   have   the   capacity   to   adapt   behavior   when   structured  
properly.    It  seems,  therefore,  that  while  tax  incentives  have  had  
little   success,   this   apparent   deficiency   should   not   obviate   their  
use  in  the  future.94  
PUBLIC-­‐‑PRIVATE  PARTNERSHIPS  
Another  mode   of   stimulating   the   private  market   for   long-­‐‑
term  care  insurance  is  the  use  of  public-­‐‑private  partnerships.    In  
1987,   the   Robert   Wood   Johnson   Foundation   facilitated   the  
development  of  public-­‐‑private  partnerships  for  long-­‐‑term  care  in  
four  states:  California,  Connecticut,  Indiana,  and  New  York.95    In  
2005,   the   Deficit   Reduction   Act   reduced   restrictions   on   state  
establishment  of  public-­‐‑private  partnerships  for  long-­‐‑term  care.96    
Following   the   flurry   of   program   implementation   that   resulted,  
41   states   now   offer   partnership   policies   and   four   others   have  
plans  for  such  policies  in  the  works.97     The  primary  objective  of  
the   partnerships   is   to   provide   higher   levels   of   asset   protection  
under  Medicaid   to   those  who   purchase   private   long-­‐‑term   care  
policies  approved  by  the  state.98    When  a  policyholder’s  benefits  
are  exhausted,  his  assets  are  protected  up  to  the  level  of  benefits  
he  recovered  from  the  partnership  approved  policy  on  top  of  the  
typical   asset   limit.99      For   example,   if   a  policy  holder   received  a  
benefit   of   $200,000   over   three   years   but   still   required   care,   he  
could   be   eligible   for   Medicaid   as   long   as   his   assets   did   not  
exceed  $202,000.     The  goal  of  asset  protection,  accordingly,  is  to  
encourage   middle-­‐‑class   Americans   to   purchase   private   long-­‐‑
term   care   insurance   instead   of   either   divesting   or   spending  
 
   94.     See  supra  p.  133-­‐‑134.    
   95.     ALLIANCE   FOR   HEALTH   REFORM,   Long-­‐‑Term   Care   Partnerships:   An   Update  
(2007)   (hereinafter   “ALLIANCE”),   http://www.allhealth.org/publications/long-­‐‑
term_care/long_term_care_partnerships_53.pdf.      
   96.     See  Public  Private  Partnerships,  supra  note  25,  at  1380.      
   97.     AMERICAN   ASSOCIATION   FOR   LONG-­‐‑TERM   CARE   INSURANCE,   Long-­‐‑Term  
Care   Insurance   Partnership   Plans   (2008),   http://www.aaltci.org/long-­‐‑term-­‐‑care-­‐‑
insurance/learning-­‐‑center/long-­‐‑term-­‐‑care-­‐‑insurance-­‐‑partnership-­‐‑plans.php.      
   98.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  83.  
   99.     See  ALLIANCE,  supra  note  95.  
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down   their   savings   in  order   to  become  eligible   for  Medicaid.100    
Critics   argue,   however,   that   offering   eligibility   to   Medicaid   is  
inconsistent  with   the   traditional  method   of   advertising   private  
insurance   policies   by   highlighting   the   deficiencies   of   public  
programs  such  as  Medicaid.101    Still  others  maintain  that  offering  
Medicaid   as   a   benefit   unintentionally   underscores   the  
availability  of  Medicaid  as  a  resource  and  therefore  unwittingly  
discourages   the   purchase   of   private   policies.      Yet   asset  
protection  is  not  the  only  feature  of  public-­‐‑private  partnerships.    
Another   feature   common   to   many   partnership   programs   is  
mandatory   availability   of   inflation   protection,   usually   3   to   5  
percent  compounded  annually.102    Although  inflation  protection  
is  desirable  to  the  extent  that  it  protects  the  value  of  the  policies,  
it  also  inexorably  raises  premium  levels  and  further  exacerbates  
the  problem  of  premium  affordability  that  has  plagued  the  long-­‐‑
term   care   insurance   market.103      In   addition   to   the   two   chief  
benefits   of   partnership   programs   touted   by   advocates   –   asset  
and   inflation   protection   –   partnership   programs   also   facilitate  
more  stringent  and  protective  regulation  of  approved  policies.104    
The   standardization   and   simplification   of   the   purchasing  
process   reduces   the   woeful   complexity   of   standard   long-­‐‑term  
care   insurance  policies  and  shifts   the  balance   from  flexibility  of  
policies   to   consumer   protection.      Unfortunately,   although   this  
 
   100.     See  Public  Private  Partnerships,  supra  note  25,  at  1380.  
   101.     See  Wiener,   supra  note   66,   at   90   (“A   significant   factor   in   the   limited   sales  
under  a  partnership  is  that  relaxing  eligibility  requirements  for  obtaining  Medicaid  
benefits   is   inconsistent  with  the  primary  message  that   insurance  agents  use  to  sell  
long-­‐‑term  care   insurance.     Long-­‐‑term  care   insurance   is  sold  primarily  by  stressing  
that   Medicaid   is   a   ‘terrible’   program   with   inferior   access   to   poorer   quality  
facilities.”).      
   102.     OFFICE   OF   PROGRAM   POLICY   ANALYSIS   &   GOV’T   ACCOUNTABILITY,  
INCREASED   PUBLIC   AWARENESS   OF   THE   LONG-­‐‑TERM   CARE   PARTNERSHIP   WOULD  
CONTRIBUTE   TO   THE   PROGRAM’S   SUCCESS   11   tbl.   A-­‐‑1   (2009),  
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0908rpt.pdf.      
   103.     See  Public  Private  Partnerships,  supra  note  25,  at  1381-­‐‑82.  
   104.     See   Public   Private   Partnerships,   supra   note   25,   at   1381   (noting   that  
partnership  programs  are  usually  more  “consumer-­‐‑protective”  than  standard  long-­‐‑
term   care   insurance   products,   as   partnership   regulations   generally   require  
standardized   benefit   triggers,   broader   coverage   of   home-­‐‑   and   community-­‐‑based  
care,   increased   data   reporting   requirements,   and   enhanced  measures   designed   to  
prevent  unintentional  policy  lapse).  
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simplification   was   much   needed,   partnership   policies,   like   tax  
incentives,   have   not   engendered   a   substantial   increase   in  
participation  rates.  
GOVERNMENT  AS  ROLE  MODEL  
In  addition  to  stimulating  the  private  market  for   long-­‐‑term  
care   insurance   through   tax   incentives   and   public-­‐‑private  
partnership  programs,   the   federal  government  and  many  states  
have   attempted   to   serve   as   role   models   for   employers   by  
offering   employees   the   opportunity   to   buy   into   group  policies.    
As  with   tax   incentives,   the   federal  government   set   the   trend   in  
2000  through  the  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Security  Act,  under  which  the  
Office   of   Personnel   Management   contracted   with   qualified  
insurance   carriers   to   administer   a   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance  
program   for   federal   employees.105      Like   Employee   Retirement  
Security  Act  (ERISA)  plans,  the  federal  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  
plan  includes  an  administrative  appeals  process  that,  along  with  
the  benefits  of  a  group  plan,  further  incentivizes  purchase.106    In  
recent  years,  a  number  of  states  followed  suit  and  began  offering  
long-­‐‑term  care   insurance  plans   to  civil   servants.107     Yet,  as  with  
the   partnership   programs   and   tax   incentives,   these   plans   have  
not  yielded  significant  results.  Many  policymakers  consequently  
began  to  perceive  the  attempt  to  expand  the  private  market  as  a  
fool’s   errand   and   started   to   consider   the   potential   utility   of  
public  programs.    The  result  of  this  shift  in  focus  was  the  cursory  
development   and   correspondingly   abrupt   failure  of   the  CLASS  
Act.  
THE  CLASS  ACT  
The  most  recent  attempt  to  expand  the  market  for  long-­‐‑term  
 
   105.     Long-­‐‑Term   Care   Security   Act,   5   U.S.C.A.   §§   9001-­‐‑9009   (2000);   See   Robin  
Miller,  Construction   and   Application   of   Long-­‐‑Term   Care   Insurance   Policies,   30   A.L.R.  
395,  400  (6th  ed.,  2008).  
   106.     See  Garber,  supra  note  8,  at  26.  
   107.     See  Miller,  supra  note  105,  at  400;  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  73-­‐‑74.  
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care  insurance  was  the  development  and  passage  of  a  voluntary  
public   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   program,   the   Community  
Living   Assistance   Services   and   Supports   Act   (CLASS   Act).108    
The  CLASS  Act  was  passed   in   2010   as   Title  VIII   of   the   Patient  
Protection   and   Affordable   Care   Act,   better   known   as  
“Obamacare,”  and  was  aimed  at  improving  access  to  more  cost-­‐‑
effective,   community-­‐‑based   long-­‐‑term   care   options.109      In   order  
to  become  eligible  to  receive  its  benefits,  enrollees  were  required  
to   maintain   premium   payments   for   five   years,   three   of   which  
must  have  been  spent  working.110    This  five  year  waiting  period,  
however,  was  not  required  to  be  consecutive,  and  with  only  an  
age-­‐‑adjusted   increase   in  premiums   for   re-­‐‑enrollees,   individuals  
could   cycle   on   and   off   depending   on   their   perceived   needs.111    
Additionally,   the  earnings   requirement  amounted   to  as   little  as  
$1,120  per  month,  thus  serving  as  a  poor  substitute  for  the  ability  
of   CLASS   administrators   to   underwrite   enrollees.112      If   eligible  
and  functionally  disabled,  beneficiaries  would  receive  a  flexible  
cash  benefit  based  on  the  severity  of  their  disability  with  no  time  
limit,   as  often   included   in  private  policies.113     While   the  benefit  
could  thus  vary  from  person  to  person,  the  average  benefit  in  the  
aggregate  was   required   to  be  $50.114      In  order   to   encourage   the  
use  of  cheaper  alternatives   to   institutional  care,   the  act  allowed  
beneficiaries  to  use  the  cash  benefit  to  fund  a  variety  of  services,  
 
   108.     Community  Living  Assistance  Services  and  Supports  Act   (“CLASS  Act”),  
Pub.  L.  No.  111-­‐‑148,  124  Stat.  828  (codified  at  42  U.S.C.A.  §  201  (2010)).  
   109.     Richard   L.   Kaplan,   Analyzing   the   Impact   of   the   New   Health   Care   Reform  
Legislation  on  Older  Americans,  18  ELDER  L.J.  213,  229  (2011);  Video:  Brenda  Spillman,  
Living  Up  to  Its  Name:  How  to  Fix  the  Class  Act,  URBAN  INSTITUTE  SYMPOSIUM  at  14:00  
(March   24,   2011,   9:00am),   http://www.urban.org/events/How-­‐‑to-­‐‑Fix-­‐‑the-­‐‑Class-­‐‑
Act.cfm.  
   110.     CLASS  Act,  supra  note  108,  at  §  300ll-­‐‑1(6)(A)  (repealed  2013).  
Securities  Act  of  1933,  ch.  38,  48  Stat.  74  (codified  as  amended  at  15  U.S.C.  §§  77a–
77aa  (2006)).  
   111.     Id.  at  §  300ll-­‐‑2(b)(1)(C)  (repealed  2013).    
   112.     OFFICE   OF   THE   CHIEF   ACTUARY,   SOCIAL   SECURITY   ONLINE,   AUTOMATIC  
DETERMINATIONS:   QUARTER   OF   COVERAGE   (2011),   http://www.ssa.gov/  
oact/cola/QC.html.  
   113.     CLASS  Act,  supra  note  108,  at  §  300ll-­‐‑2(b)(1)  (repealed  2013).    
   114.     Id.  at  §§  300ll-­‐‑2(a)(1)(D)(i)  and  (ii),  (repealed  2013).    
FINALCOPY.KYLE.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   2/20/14    2:13  PM  
2013   CONFRONTING  THE  ELDER  CARE  CRISIS   123  
including  those  provided  by  family  members.115  
The   CLASS   program’s   coupling   of   voluntary   enrollment  
with   no   underwriting   and   a   generous   benefit   package   swiftly  
struck   many   as   creating   a   problematic   mixture   of   incentives.    
Doubts  about  the  program’s  feasibility  crossed  both  sides  of  the  
political   aisle116   and   even   emerged   within   the   Obama  
administration.117    Critics  argued  that  the  only  reason  the  CLASS  
Act  was   being   considered  was   its   illusory   $60   billion   in   deficit  
reduction   over   the   relevant   10-­‐‑year   projection   made   by   the  
Congressional   Budget   Office.118      Of   course,   these   savings   only  
accrued  in  the  first  ten  years  because  the  program  would  collect  
premiums   while   paying   no   benefits   for   5   of   the   10   years.    
Despite  doubts  of   the  program’s  feasibility,  Health  and  Human  
Services   Secretary   Kathleen   Sebelius   assured   Congress   in  
February  of  2011  that  she  believed  that  with  some  tweaking,  the  
program  could  be  implemented.119  
Yet,  on  October  14,  2011,  after  a  19-­‐‑month  effort  to  develop  
a   solvent   program   in   keeping   with   the   statutory   requirement  
that   the   CLASS   program   remain   self-­‐‑sustaining   for   75   years,120  
the  actuaries,  attorneys,  and  administrators  within  DHHS  came  
to  the  conclusion  that  the  program  could  not  be  implemented.121    
 
   115.     See  Kaplan,  supra  note  109,  at  229  (“CLASS  Act  benefits  can  also  be  used  to  
modify   an   elder’s   personal   residence   to   enable   that   person   to   continue   living   at  
home.      They   can   even   pay   a   family   member   who   provides   caregiving   services,  
without  necessarily  having  a  formal  family  caregiving  agreement.  In  this  sense,  the  
CLASS   Act   is   more   flexible   than   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   policies   that   typically  
have  numerous  restrictions  on  the  payment  of  family  caregivers,  if  they  cover  such  
payments  at  all.”).  
   116.     See   Lori   Montgomery,   Proposed   Long-­‐‑Term   Insurance   Program   Raises  
Questions,  WASHINGTON  POST,  Oct.  27,  2009,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐‑
dyn/content/article/2009/10/27/AR2009102701417.html.  
   117.     See   Avik   Roy,  CLASS-­‐‑Gate:   Internal   Emails   Reveal   Administration   Knew  All  
Along   that  Obamacare’s   Long-­‐‑Term  Care   Entitlement  Was   a   “Fiscal  Disaster,”   FORBES,  
Sept.   19,   2011,   4:59   PM,   http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/09/15/class-­‐‑gate-­‐‑
internal-­‐‑emails-­‐‑reveal-­‐‑administration-­‐‑knew-­‐‑all-­‐‑along-­‐‑that-­‐‑obamacares-­‐‑long-­‐‑term-­‐‑
care-­‐‑entitlement-­‐‑was-­‐‑a-­‐‑fiscal-­‐‑disaster.  
   118.     See  generally  Montgomery,  supra  note  116.  
   119.     See  Robert  Pear,  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Needs  Changes,  Officials  Say,  N.Y.  TIMES,  
Feb.  21,  2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/health/policy/22care.html?_r=1.  
   120.       CLASS  Act,  supra  note  108,  at  §  300ll-­‐‑2(a)(1)(A)  (repealed  2013).  
   121.     U.S.  DEP’T.  OF  HEALTH  AND  HUMAN  SERV.,  112TH  CONG.,  A  REPORT  ON  THE  
ACTUARIAL,  MARKETING,  AND  LEGAL  ANALYSES  OF  THE  CLASS  PROGRAM  46  (2011)  
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Although  the  CLASS  team  developed  a  number  of  mechanisms  
to  improve  the  risk  pool,  these  efforts  varied  along  a  spectrum  of  
legality.122      As   a   result,   the   CLASS   team   could   not   find   an  
appropriate   balance   between   a   program   that   remained   solvent  
and  one  that  complied  with  even  a  strained  interpretation  of  the  
statutory   language.123      Contributing   to   this   difficulty,   the   Act  
was  both  fatally  narrow  in  its  construction  and  naively  bereft  of  
an  adequate  understanding  of   the  extensive  challenges   that   the  
private  market  has  faced  for  years.124  Thus,  the  CLASS  Act  failed  
ultimately   because   it  was   “a   program.  .  .built   on   the   heart   and  
especially   on   the   current   political   environment,   [but]   not   on  
sound  technical  advice  in  advance  of  drafting.”125    In  the  wake  of  
the  CLASS  Act’s  failure  and  the  marginal  success  of  the  existing  
efforts   to  expand  the  private  market,  policymakers  must  seek  a  
new  and  comprehensive  path  forward.  
THE  UTILITY  OF  HYBRID  PLANS  
As  the   failure  of   the  CLASS  Act  has  demonstrated,   the  attempt  
to   fulfill   the   nation’s   long-­‐‑term   care   needs   through   a   public  
program  will   not   prove   viable   in   the   near   future.      Aside   from  
being   a   political   non-­‐‑starter,126   the   burden   of   such   a   program  
would  simply  be   too  difficult   for   the  country   to  bear  alongside  
the  outlays  already  required  to  sustain  the  Medicare  and  Social  
Security  systems.127     Moreover,  although  outside  the  pale  of   the  
 
[hereinafter  “CLASS  REPORT”].  
   122.     Id.at  43.    
   123.     See  generally  Memorandum  from  Kathy  Greenlee,  CLASS  Administrator,  to  
Secretary   Sebelius   (Oct.   14,   2011)   [hereinafter   “CLASS   MEMO”]   (describing   the  
CLASS   team’s   inability   to   craft   a   policy   that   was   both   actuarially   and   legally  
sustainable).  
   124.     See  CLASS  REPORT,  supra  note  121,  at  44-­‐‑6;  CLASS  MEMO,  supra  note  123,  at  
2.  
   125.     See  Spillman,  supra  note  109,  at  14:21.  
   126.     See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  95.    
   127.     CONG.   BUDGET   OFFICE,   THE   LONG-­‐‑TERM   OUTLOOK   FOR   MEDICARE,  
MEDICAID,   AND   TOTAL   HEALTH   CARE   SPENDING,   25   tbl.   2.2,  
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10297/chapter2.5.1.shtml;  Garber,   supra   note  
8,  at  161  (“even  if  general  funds  could  pay  for  long-­‐‑term  care  of  the  elderly  today,  
any   such   approach   offers   only   a   temporary   solution,   since   the   burden   of  
subsidizing   the   care   of   elderly   baby   boomers   will   be   heavier   and   will   fall   on   a  
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debate  over  the  CLASS  Act,  a  public  program  for  long-­‐‑term  care  
would   in  all   likelihood  suffer   from  a   tremendous  moral  hazard  
problem,   given   the   unique   characteristics   of   long-­‐‑term   care  
services.    Medicare,  particularly  with  the  emergence  of  Medigap  
policies,  certainly  provides  a  stern  warning  of  the  moral  hazard  
problems   a   public   program   would   face–especially   one   with  
lifetime  benefits.128     In  fact,  a  public  program  for  long-­‐‑term  care  
offering   front-­‐‑end   coverage   would   suffer   from   an   assuredly  
more  acute  moral  hazard  problem  in  light  of  the  broad  utility  of  
long-­‐‑term   care   services.129      Unlike   conventional   healthcare,  
which   treats   specific   diseases   and   ailments,   long-­‐‑term   care  
consists   of   services   and   goods   that  would   convenience   a  wide  
range   of   elderly   individuals.130      While   conventional   healthcare  
such  as  dialysis,  for  example,  has  a  discrete  benefit  to  those  with  
kidney   failure,   many   forms   of   long-­‐‑term   care,   such   as   food  
preparation,   provide   a   nearly   universal   benefit   to   the   elderly,  
including  those  on  the  margins  of  qualification.     Compounding  
this  problem  is  the  relatively  vague  determination  of  functional  
disability   and   subsequent   need   for   long-­‐‑term   care   services.131    
With  a  malleable  standard  of  need  –   inability   to  perform  2   to  3  
activities   of   daily   living   –   the   risk   of   over-­‐‑utilization   is   further  
increased.      This   practical   danger,   in   conjunction   with   the  
political   intractability   of   a   public   program   in   the   current  
environment,   underscores   the   utility   of   a   plan   to   expand   the  
private  market.  
Although   recent   efforts   to   expand   the   private   market  
 
smaller  population  of  working  adults.”).  
   128.     See  Mark  V.   Pauly,  Medicare  Drug  Coverage   and  Moral  Hazard,   23  HEALTH  
AFF.   113   (2004);   Willard   G.   Manning   &   M.   Susan   Marquis,  Health   Insurance:   The  
Tradeoff  Between  Risk  Pooling  and  Moral  Hazard,  15  J.  HEALTH  ECON.  609    (1996);  John  
H.  Goddeeris  &  John  R.  Wolfe,  Adverse  Selection,  Moral  Hazard,  and  Wealth  Effects  in  
the  Medigap  Insurance  Market,  10  J.  HEALTH  ECON.  433  (1991).  
   129.     This   moral   hazard   problem,   however,   would   prove   less   severe   if   a  
catastrophic  care  benefit  were  offered  through  a  public  program.  
   130.     See  Garber,  supra  note  8,  at  164.  
   131.     See   id.   (“Because   the   criteria   used   to   determine   the   ‘need’   for   long-­‐‑term  
services  are  less  precise  and  more  easily  manipulated  than,  say,  the  diagnosis  of  a  
heart   attack,   the   close   substitutability   of   housing   and   other   services   means   that  
long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  is   likely  to  increase  utilization  substantially,  and  that  the  
distortions  will  be  larger  than  for  conventional  medical  insurance.”).  
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through  tax  incentives  and  public-­‐‑private  partnerships  have  not  
yielded   dramatic   success,132   one   should   not   conclude   that   the  
private  market  cannot  be  strengthened.    The  continued  viability  
of   a   more   vibrant   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   market   is   perhaps  
most   properly   illustrated   by   the   reality   that,   with   perfect  
information   regarding   the   risks   of   long-­‐‑term   care,   many  more  
users   would   purchase   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   policies.      In  
other  words,   there   is  not   a   shortage   in  need   for   long-­‐‑term  care  
coverage,   but   rather   an   informational   and   structural   deficiency  
that   has   prevented   the   market’s   growth.      Private   insurance  
therefore   is   not   unsuitable   to   the   task   of   extending   long-­‐‑term  
care  coverage  even  though  it  inarguably  faces  a  complex  array  of  
challenges   to   expansion.133      Yet,   a   successful   plan   could  
counteract   the   compounding   problems   facing   the   market   by  
engendering  correspondingly   compounding  benefits–a   capacity  
that  leaves  the  successful  expansion  of  the  private  market  more  
attainable  than  many  critics  may  suggest.    One  solution  that  has  
the  potential   to   craft   the   right   balance   of   incentives   to   increase  
long-­‐‑term   care   coverage   is   the   development   and   promotion   of  
hybrid   insurance   policies   that   bundle   long-­‐‑term   care   coverage  
with  either  whole  life  insurance  or  annuities.  
STRUCTURAL  BENEFITS  
Bundling   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   policies   with   life  
insurance   or   annuities   offers   significant   structural   benefits   that  
have  the  potential  to  make  great  inroads  into  the  long-­‐‑term  care  
coverage   gap.      First,   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   naturally  
complements   annuity   and   life   insurance   policies,   as   it   aims   to  
achieve   the   same   fundamental   goal   –   purchasers   of   long-­‐‑term  
care   insurance,  annuities,  and   life   insurance  policies  all  wish   to  
avoid   burdening   their   families,   whether   because   of   untimely  
death,  prolonged  life,  or  functional  disability.134    Second,  as  with  
 
   132.     See  infra  p.  118-­‐‑126.    
   133.     See  infra  p.  111-­‐‑118.    
   134.     Although,   in   the   case   of   life   insurance,   purchasers   technically   wish   to  
prevent  their  death  from  becoming  a  burden  on  their  relatives,  but  the  underlying  
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life   insurance   and   annuities,   long-­‐‑term   care   risk   pools   best  
mitigate   adverse   selection  by  attracting  younger  populations.135    
By  marketing   long-­‐‑term  care   insurance  as  a  bundling  option   to  
younger   life   insurance   or   annuity   purchasers,   insurers   could  
both   expand   awareness   of   the   benefits   of   long-­‐‑term   care  
coverage   while   simultaneously   decreasing   the   average   age   of  
purchase.    Any  decrease  in  the  age  of  purchase,  of  course,  would  
enhance  the  risk  pool  and  begin  to  mitigate  the  adverse  selection  
problems  the  market  faces.136  
Perhaps  most  importantly,  however,  hybrid  policies  would  
have  a  transformative  effect  on  another  facet  of  the  information  
gap.      In   addition   to   failing   to   appreciate   their   risk   adequately,  
potential   consumers   of   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   also   face   a  
severe   psychological   barrier   to   purchasing   a   product   they  
believe   may   be   “lost”   or   “wasted.”      Unlike   the   case   of   auto  
insurance,  in  which  people  more  readily  accept  the  risk137  of  not  
using   their   policy,   potential   purchasers   of   long-­‐‑term   care  
insurance   products   have   a   unique   fear   of   non-­‐‑use   that   stems  
from   the   distant   nature   of   the   long-­‐‑term   care   risk.138      Hybrid  
policies,  however,  assuage  this  risk  almost  entirely.      In  the  case  
of  annuities,  the  insured  has  the  capacity  to  accelerate  or  modify  
annuity   payments   to   provide   for   long-­‐‑term   care   needs,   but  
failure  to  capitalize  on  this  function  of  the  policy  does  not  render  
 
motivation  is  the  same.    See  Wiener,  supra  note  66,  at  88.  
   135.     See  Garber,  supra  note  8,  at  162-­‐‑63  (“Many  private  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  
policies  are   structured   like  either  whole-­‐‑life  or   level-­‐‑premium  term   life   insurance.    
They  are  relatively  inexpensive  for  people  who  begin  purchasing  coverage  at  a  time  
when  the  probability  of  a  claim  is  very  low  and  adverse  selection  is  unlikely  to  be  a  
significant  problem.  Adverse   selection   is   a   far  more   serious  problem  at   advanced  
ages,  when   functional   impairment   is   frequent,  because  methods   to   screen   for   risk  
factors   for   institutionalization   are   imperfect.      There   would   be   difficulties   even   if  
adverse   selection   could   be   overcome,   since   actuarially   fair   insurance   would   be  
prohibitively  expensive  for  many  of  the  at-­‐‑risk  elderly.”).  
   136.     See  infra  p.  114-­‐‑115.  
   137.     Assuredly,   those  who  do  not  have  to  use  their  policies  are  more  properly  
considered  lucky,  not  victims  of  risk.  
   138.     Marc  P.  Freiman,  Can  1+1=3:  A  Look  at  Hybrid  Insurance  Products  with  Long-­‐‑
Term   Care   Insurance,   (AARP   Public   Policy   Institute),   May   2007,   at   iv   (“some  
consumers  may  feel  that  they  have  ‘lost’  or  ‘wasted’  all  of  their  premium  payments,  
even  though  they  probably  do  not  adopt  similar  perspectives  towards  home  and  car  
insurance.”).    
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the   policy   “worthless,”   as   the   insured   still   receives   annuity  
payments  as  scheduled.    Similarly,  in  a  hybrid  life  and  long-­‐‑term  
care  insurance  policy,  the  insured  receives  a  benefit  to  help  pay  
for   long-­‐‑term   care   needs   that   diminishes   the   total   value   of   the  
policy.     Again,  however,   the   insured  does  not  suffer   the  risk  of  
“wasting”  the  policy  in  the  alternative,  as  the  death  benefit  and  
cash  value  remain  undisturbed  if  no  long-­‐‑term  care  needs  arise.    
As  a  result,  when  bundled  with  life  insurance  or  with  annuities,  
long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   hybrids   would   all   but   completely  
eliminate  the  danger  –  whether  real  or  illusory  –  that  purchasers  
would  not  derive  full  value  from  the  product.    In  addition  to  the  
structural  benefits  that  accrue  to  hybrids  with  life  insurance  and  
annuities,  both   forms  of  hybrids  also  carry  with   them  a  unique  
set  of  benefits.  
LIFE  INSURANCE  HYBRID  
When   bundling   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   with   life  
insurance,   whole   life   insurance   seems   to   serve   as   the   best  
platform,   given   the   dual   savings   and   death   components   of  
whole  life  plans.139    Similar  to  a  partial  withdrawal  in  a  universal  
life   insurance   policy,   upon   the   emergence   of   long-­‐‑term   care  
needs,   the  policyholder  can  file  a  claim  that  will  carry  with   it  a  
subsequent   reduction   of   the   death   benefit.140      Perhaps   the  
greatest   advantage   of   bundling   long-­‐‑term   care  with  whole   life  
insurance   is   the   incorporation   of   a   savings   component   into   the  
long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  scheme,  the  absence  of  which  is  a  long  
 
   139.     See   ROBERT  H.   JERRY,   UNDERSTANDING   INSURANCE   LAW   37   (3d   ed.   2002)  
(observing   that  whole   life   insurance   “is   really   two   things   in   one:   it   is   a   policy   of  
term   insurance   and   a   savings   plan.   Part   of   every   premium   covers   the   cost   of   the  
insurance,  and  the  remainder  goes  into  the  savings  component  of  the  product.”).  
   140.     See   Elizabeth   Ody,   Insurers   Pair   Long-­‐‑Term   Care   with   Life   to   Entice   Older  
Buyers,   BLOOMBERG,   May   17,   2011,   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-­‐‑05-­‐‑
18/insurers-­‐‑pair-­‐‑long-­‐‑term-­‐‑care-­‐‑with-­‐‑life-­‐‑to-­‐‑entice-­‐‑older-­‐‑buyers.html.    One  example  
of   this   dollar-­‐‑for-­‐‑dollar   reduction   is   an   accelerated   death   benefit   that   acts   as   an  
optional   rider   on   a   life   insurance   policy   and   permits   the   policyholder   to  
“accelerate”   all   or   part   of   the   death   benefit   when   certain   qualifying   events   or  
triggers  occur.  See  Freiman,  supra  note  138,  at  id.  
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heralded   deficiency   of   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   policies.141     As  
one  industry  expert  observed:  
[M]ost   people   have   only   limited   resources,   and  many  
are   unwilling   to   purchase   insurance  where   the   policy  
offers   no   accumulation   feature;   i.e.,   where   the  
premiums   paid   are   lost   to   the   policyholder   if   the  
insurance   is   not  used.     Without   some   sort   of   ‘savings’  
feature,   consumers   with   limited   resources   often   were  
not  willing  to  purchase  insurance,   including  long-­‐‑term  
care   insurance,   even   though   they   recognize   its  
importance.142  
At   least   one   empirical   study   confirms   this   observation,  
finding  that  demand  for  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  policies  would  
be  higher  if  a  savings  component  were  included.143    The  savings  
component   of   the   life   insurance   hybrid   would   therefore  
substantially   increase   the   desirability   of   the   hybrid   product  
relative   to   the   individual   long-­‐‑term   care  policy.      In   addition   to  
providing  a  savings  component,  the  bundling  of  long-­‐‑term  care  
with   life   insurance   also   has   the   potential   to   reduce   premium  
costs   through   decreased   administrative   costs   and   savings  
associated   with   the   dual   benefit   structure.      Accordingly,   the  
savings  component  and  the  potential   for  premium  reduction  of  
life   and   long-­‐‑term   care   hybrids,   along   with   the   structural  
benefits   outlined   above,   point   to   the   viability   of   life   and   long-­‐‑
term  care  insurance  hybrids  as  a  means  of  expanding  long-­‐‑term  
care  coverage.  
ANNUITY  HYBRID  
As  with  the  life  insurance  hybrid  model,  annuities  bundled  
with   long-­‐‑term   care   coverage   also   offer   an   investment  
component;   indeed,   annuities   are   considered   an   investment  
 
   141.     See  supra  note  49  and  accompanying  text.  
   142.     Planning  for  Long-­‐‑Term  Care:  Testimony  Before  the  Subcomm.  on  Health,  Comm.  
on   Energy   and   Commerce,   109th   Cong.   8   (2006)(statement   of   Gregory   F.   Jenner,  
American  Council  of  Life  Insurers).  
   143.     NEW  YORK  DEPARTMENT  OF  HEALTH,  NEW  YORK  STATE  MANAGED  LONG-­‐‑
TERM   CARE,   REPORT   TO   THE   GOVERNOR   (2005),  
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/managed_care/mltc/pdf/mltc_final_rep.pdf.  
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rather  than  insurance  by  most  courts.144     Yet  the  annuity  hybrid  
carries   with   it   the   particularly   unique   benefit   of   offsetting   the  
respective   adverse   selection   risks   of   individual   long-­‐‑term   care  
and   annuity   policies.145      Individuals   more   likely   to   need   long-­‐‑
term  care  services  are  also  less  likely  to  live  a  long  time,  as  they  
are   typically   less  healthy.146     Accordingly,   by  bundling   the   two  
products,  the  relative  need  for  underwriting  is  diminished.147    In  
a  2001  study,  Murtaugh,  Spillman,  and  Warshawsky  found  that  
the  hybrid  product  would  reduce  premium  costs  by  at  least  five  
percent  relative  to  the  individually  sold  products.148    Building  off  
this   analysis,  Webb   confirms   that   the   selection   effects   for   each  
particular   market   work   in   opposite   directions   and   that   the  
bundling  of   the   two  products   creates   an   equilibrium  allocation  
that   not   only   benefits   from   this   offsetting   selection   effect,   but  
also   proves   more   attractive   than   the   stand-­‐‑alone   products.149    
While   both   of   these   analyses   were   hypothetical,   their   findings  
are   no   less   illuminating   and   likely   represent   conservative  
estimates   of   the   potential   of   hybrid   policies.      Just   as   there   is   a  
critical  level  of  adverse  selection  that  can  lead  a  risk  pool  into  a  
“death   spiral,”   so   too   is   there   a   level   of   risk   diffusion   that   can  
spur   the   growth   of   the   market.      Accordingly,   the   initial   cost-­‐‑
savings   benefit   that   insurers   and   insured’s   would   derive   from  
hybrid   long-­‐‑term   care   annuities   would   likely   have  
compounding  effects.  
 
   144.     See,   e.g.,   Jerry,   supra   note   139,   at   44;   NationsBank   of   North   Carolina   v.  
Variable  Annuity  Life  Ins.  Co.,  513  U.S.  251,  251-­‐‑2  (1995);  Sec.  &  Exch.  Comm’n  v.  
Variable  Annuity  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  359  U.S.  251,  252  (1995).  
   145.     See   JUDITH   FEDER,  HARRIET   KOMISAR,   ROBERT   B.   FRIEDLAND,   LONG-­‐‑TERM  
CARE   FINANCING:   POLICY   OPTIONS   FOR   THE   FUTURE,   GEORGETOWN   UNIVERSITY  
LONG-­‐‑TERM  CARE  FINANCING  PROJECT  27  (2007),     http://ltc.georgetown.edu/forum/  
ltcfinalpaper061107.pdf.  
   146.     See   David   C.   Webb,   Long-­‐‑Term   Care   Insurance,   Annuities   and   Asymmetric  
Information:   The   Case   for   Bundling   Contracts,   LONDON   SCHOOL   OF   ECONOMICS   21  
(2006),  http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24507/1/dp530.pdf.    
   147.     See  FEDER,  supra  note  145,  at  27.  
   148.     Christopher   Murtaugh,   Brenda   Spillman,   and   Mark   J.   Warshawsky,   In  
Sickness  and  in  Health:  An  Annuity  Approach  to  Financing  Long-­‐‑Term  Care  Insurance,  68  
J.  RISK  &  INS.  225,  227  (2001).  
   149.     See  Webb,  supra  note  146,  at  26.  
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STRATEGIES  FOR  STIMULATING  THE  HYBRID  MARKET  
Given   the   potentially   significant   benefits   of   an   expanded  
hybrid   market,   the   need   to   encourage   growth   of   the   market  
seems  self-­‐‑evident.     Although  a  comprehensive  plan  to  develop  
the   hybrid   market   is   beyond   the   scope   of   this   Article,   a   few  
strategies  and  challenges  bear  mention.    First,  while  the  creation  
of  tax  incentives  to  spur  the  growth  of  the  long-­‐‑term  care  market  
has   not   yielded   dramatic   results   thus   far,   this   apparent  
inadequacy   does   not   lead   to   the   conclusion   that   tax   incentives  
are  an  inapt  vehicle  for  growth.150    Under  the  Pension  Protection  
Act   of   2006,   tax   free   exchanges   are   now   possible   between  
annuities,   life   insurance,   and   long-­‐‑term   care   contracts,   but   in  
order   to   compensate   for   the   lost   revenue,   legislators  
implemented  a  requirement  that  insurers  capitalize  a  percentage  
of   their   policy   acquisition   expenses   for   a   particular   line   of  
insurance.151      This   percentage   varies   by   product   –   1.75   percent  
for   annuities,   2.05   on   group   life,   and   7.7   on   other   insurance  
including  hybrid  products  –  thus  creating  a  disincentive  for  sale  
of   hybrid   products.152      Not   only   should   policymakers   remove  
this  functional  inhibition,  but  they  should  also  create  additional  
incentives  specifically  for  hybrid  products.     Further,   in  order  to  
cultivate  a   sustainable  hybrid  market,   lawmakers  must  address  
the   fragmented   regulatory   system   insurers   will   face   and   the  
difficulty  consumers  will  have  in  understanding  a  hybrid  of  two  
products   that  are  complicated   in   their  own  right.153     The  reality  
that   regulators   already   struggle   to   adequately   monitor  
individual   long-­‐‑term   care   insurance   products   only   further  
underscores   the   need   for   an   improved   regulatory   structure.154    
One   initial   strategy   to   combat   these   difficulties   could   be   to  
incorporate   the   hybrid   products   into   the   already   existing  
 
   150.     See  infra  p.  118-­‐‑121.      
   151.     Pension   Protection  Act   of   2006,   Pub.   L.   No.   109-­‐‑280,   120   Stat.   780   (2006)  
(codified  in  scattered  sections  of  the  I.R.C.  and  29  U.S.C.).  
   152.     Id.;  See  also  Freiman,  supra  note  138,  at  19.  
   153.     See  Freiman,  supra  note  138,  at  vi,  19.  
   154.     See  supra  notes  56-­‐‑57  and  accompanying  text.  
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structure   of   state   partnership   programs   for   long-­‐‑term   care.155    
The   framework   provided   by   the   partnership   programs   could  
provide  a  valuable  platform  for  developing  a  unified  regulatory  
format   and   for   aiding   consumers   in   choosing   the   product   that  
best  suits  their  needs.  
These   suggestions,   however,   are   merely   intended   as   a  
springboard   for   further   analysis   and   inquiry   by   scholars,  
lawmakers,   and   regulators   into   the   viability   of   different  
strategies   for   expanding   the   hybrid  market.      Regardless   of   the  
perceived   utility   of   the   strategies   outlined   above,   the   central  
point  remains  that  the  present  regulatory  incentive  structure  will  
not  prove  adequate  in  the  effort  to  expand  the  hybrid  market.  
CONCLUSION  
The   development   and   promotion   of   hybrid   policies   has  
significant   potential   to   expand   coverage   of   our   nation’s   long-­‐‑
term  care  needs  by  addressing   the   structural  problems   that   the  
private   and  public   sectors   have   faced   in   their   effort   to   provide  
long-­‐‑term  care  insurance.    The  long-­‐‑term  care  insurance  market,  
however,   faces   a   complex   array   of   issues   that   demand   a  
correspondingly   comprehensive   response.      Hybrid   plans   can  
provide  a  catalyst  for  growth,  but  their  promotion  will  not  act  as  
a   panacea.      If   the   nation   is   to   meet   its   long-­‐‑term   care   needs,  
hybrid   plans  must   be   part   of   a   broader   framework   of   policies  
aimed   at   alleviating   the   overburdened   Medicaid   system   and  
widely   expanding   private   coverage.      For   example,   the  
development   of   a   catastrophic   public   benefit   program   could  
serve  as  a  relatively  inexpensive  but  valuable  complement  to  the  
private   market   that   would   incentivize   participation   in   the  
private  market.156    Still  other  mechanisms  exist,  but  they  require  
both   the   devotion   of   energy   on   the   part   of   policymakers   and,  
most  importantly,  a  recognition  of  the  serious  challenges  that  the  
private   market   and   Medicaid   face.      As   the   nation   ages,   these  
 
   155.     See  infra  p.  121-­‐‑123.    
   156.     See  Garber,  supra  note  8,  at  164.  
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challenges  will  only  continue  to  grow  more  daunting.     Delayed  
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